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Trivial and Non-Trivial Systems 
Systems theory views systems comprised of interacting or interdependent entities, real or abstract, forming 
an integrated whole that receive input from their environment (in the case of living systems it is necessary to 
have material, energy and data) and transform it via throughput into output. In the initial vision of the founders 
of cybernetics, systems were required to function as reliable machines, which are possible to direct from the 
outside and be used for some purpose. One can, for example, press a button on a coffee automat and in a few 
moments have a cup of hot coffee. This kind of system (or machine) is determinative: the input (pressing the 
button) always gives a certain result (the button pusher receives the desired coffee). This relationship between 
the input and the output determines the construction of the machine. 
In our everyday lives, we are constantly in contact with such systems - be they in the form of automobiles, 
printers or toasters. Founder of second-order cybernetics Heinz von Foerster (1997, p. 34) named such systems 
„trivial machines" (figure 1). 
Figure 1. Trivial Machine 
Source: von Foerster 1997, p. 35 
The square in the figure represents a machine, the function ( f ) of which is determined by its creators. The 
letter x is the input and y is the output. The function of the machine is to tie the input in the predetermined 
manner to the output, or y = f(x). The output y shows how the machine reacts to the input x - and therefore 
the output is entirely dependent on the input. Von Foerster offered four possibilities to explain the operation 
of a trivial machine {ibid., p. 35): 
If the machine „recognizes" or „sees" the input (reason) A, it then produces output (influence, effect) 1; 
in the case of B, the output is 2, etc. Here, a mechanical cause and effect scheme is functioning: in accordance 
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with some law, cause x produces the result y. 
Depending on how the numbers and letters are combined among themselves, with four input and four 
output values, it is possible to construct (design) 44 = 256 such machines. Whether the number of input 
options is four or four billion, this type of machine is always predictable: as long as the machine is not broken, 
it will not surprise the machine's user. 
Non-trivial machines are entirely different. They react not only to input, but also to their own internal 
states. Von Foerster presented the simplest model of this type of machine (figure 2) which is comprised of the 
input x, output y and its internal state z, which has two possible functions: y = f(x,z) andy = g(x,z). 
Figure 2. Non-Trivial Machine 
Source: von Foerster 1997, p. 38, presented here in modified form 
In this case, the output y is dependent not only upon the input, but also upon the internal state of the 
machine. As a practical matter, what this means is that even in the case of two possibilities (f and g), the 
same input may not necessarily result in the same output. Von Foerster wrote (ibid., p. 38): „the machine's 
operations are dependent upon its past operations." This may be interpreted to mean that the internal states of 
the machine are the system's memoiy. Von Foerster suggested that a non-trivial machine should be analyzed 
as if it were comprised of a series of different non-trivial machines. Thus, in the case of the different binary 
possibilities (n = 1,2, 3, 4) of x and y, the number of possible trivial machines is enormous and the task is to 
find the single machine whose output is considered acceptable. Even in the case of one input variable (n = 
1 binary possibilities), the possibility of 105 different machines must be considered. If n represents 2 binary 
possibilities, the number of possible machines is almost 1077, in the case of n = 3 the number is lO4002 and in 
the case of n = 4 it is 1070003. To illustrate this, Von Foerster (1977, p. 40) has set forth the following data: 
If there are 2 input and output variables, then in order to produce a non-trivial machine, it would be 
necessary to have 65, 536 trivial machines, from which is necessary to isolate the one machine that produces 
the desired output. If, however, there are four different variables, it would be necessary to try 102466 different 
trivial machines. In the case of 8 variables, the number reaches io969685486. Von Foerster has noted (ibid, 40), 
that the age of the earth is approximately 5 x 1023 microseconds. If it requires even just one microsecond 
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to „test" each machine, one may calculate how many earth ages would be necessary to find the appropriate 
output for the user. Here, von Foerster used the term transcomputational: the output of such machines is not 
capable of calculation. Non-trivial machines are unpredictable. 
Mechanical machines that we see in our everyday lives are trivial systems. They respond to an object-
subject relationship. However, humans and their forms of social order - various groups and subgroups - are 
non-trivial systems. A person's nervous system is not observable from the outside and a person is capable of 
learning and changing. A simple example: imagine that you have told a joke to a companion and he laughs 
wholeheartedly. If you tell him the joke again for a second time, he may give a grudging smile. Upon the 
third retelling, he would like to hit you. The human body is complicated and capable of learning. In the same 
manner, society and its subsystems - a couple's relationship, family, organization, business, the state - are 
also non-trivial systems. They are also analytically unpredictable, dependent on the past and should not be 
directed by the logic of linear cause and effect relationships. 
Instead, an amazing paradox comes to light: social science studies, including media and communication 
studies, follow the trivial machine model. The input x is often named the independent variable and the output 
y the dependent variable. Empirical studies then attempt to prove a connection between the two. Derived 
from this, x and_y may have many different labels: cause {causa) and effect (effectus), stimulus and influence, 
question and answer, advertising and consumption, etc. In other words, social sciences assume that a person 
and society act as trivial machines. 
Since those studies are predominantly successful, it might be tempting to conclude that it is possible to 
describe people, as well as society and its subsystems, notwithstanding their internal states and memories, as 
trivial machines. Moreover: people and groups may be directed to act in the same manner as trivial machines 
- not only in the army, for example, but also, with the assistance of strategic communication (advertising, 
public relations, propaganda). Furthermore, if individuals do not submit to such direction, then they are 
considered by the rest of society to be stubborn, untrustworthy, capricious and bad. 
A question arises: What enables an individual and society to be handled as a trivial machine? This 
appears to be a contradiction between cognitive autonomy and social orientation. Looking at it from one side, 
individuals and groups are unarguably non-trivial systems that have their own complexities and memories. 
This should make them unpredictable. Looking at it from the other side, an individual is a social being and as 
such is in constant interaction with other individuals. This interaction is not at all disorderly or haphazard or 
in any way similar to Brownian movement. On the contrary, it is meaningful, coherent and stable: individuals 
react understandably and predictably to events and new information. How is this possible? 
Another Paradox 
The issue of the relationship between cognitive autonomy and social orientation is also essential in the context 
of media studies. Elihu Katzi and Paul Relix Lazarsfeld concluded in 1955 in their book, Personal Influence, 
that it is precisely the study of influence that is the research engine of mass communication. In the final 
analysis, researching communication is all about learning to understand influence {see Katz & Lazarsfeld 
1955, p. 18). German communication scientist Karsten Renckstorf wrote more than 10 years ago that the 
legitimacy of communication theory as an academic discipline is due to its central interest in the influence of 
communication (Renckstorf 1995). 
Currently, the situation has developed in studies of media influence that for the last half century the 
predominant theory has embraced the minimal influence model. It emphasizes the great importance of 
individual and structural factors and reduces the role of media to mere amplification (Blumer & McQuail 
1968; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1944; McQuail 2003, pp. 374-379, 401-423; Miller 1991, pp. 1-4). 
At the same time, there are numerous results of studies that create doubt about the validity of the hypothesis 
of limited or restricted media influence. Empirical studies have, on at least twenty occasions, proven the 
sufficiently tight relationship between media content and survey results (Fan & Tims 1989; Holbrook 1996; 
Iyengar & Simon 2000; Lawson & McCann 2005; McCombs & Shaw 1972; Palmaru 2005; Roberts 1992; 
Shaw 1999; Valenzuela & McCombs 2007; and others). 
An important study of the influence of media from the 1999 and 2003 Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) 
and 2002 local municipal government {volikogu) elections (table 1) serves as a significant example. Let it 
be stated that this is the first time on this side of the Oder-Neisse line that the influence of media has been 
measured. 
25 
Raivo Palmaru, K. Jaak Roosaare 
Table 1. Linear regression models: dependence of election results upon the valuation of political parties in the 
print media and advertising 
9 pre-election weeks: 8 pre-election weeks: 9 pre-election weeks: 
Jan. 4 - J u n e 1, 1999 Sept. 3 - Oct. 19,2002 Jan. 1 - Mar. 1,2003 
Adjusted R2 0.971 0.966 0.994 
s e 1.860 1.395 1.264 
Significance 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Arguments Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
X p 0.987 0.000 1.545 0.004 1.445 0.004 
X e   -1.909 0.029 -.845 0.041 
X n   1.421 0.029 1.125 0.007 
X a     -.767 0.005 
Source: Palmaru 2005, p. 41 
The argument variables are positive media coverage (x^); neutral (xe) and negative (xn) media coverage; and in 
2003 also frequency of positive advertisements (xa). Adjusted R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination, se 
is the standard error, significance stands for the significance of the model, Beta is the standardized regression 
coefficient and Sig is their significance. 
From the values of Adjusted R2, it can be seen that in all three instances it is possible to speak of the strong 
relationship between election results and how the different political parties were presented in the print media. 
At the same time, the accumulation effect appeared: the political party preferences of those individuals who 
participated in the election by casting a ballot accumulated on the basis of available information diachronically 
during a period lasting several weeks. 
After Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw presented their Chapel Hill survey results in 1972, the 
agenda-setting effect has found confirmation more than 350 times (Valenzuela & McCombs 2007,6). In some 
of those studies, the results have exceeded the assumptions of the agenda-setting theory (see, for example, 
Ha 2005, p. 5; Son & Weaver 2006, p. 190; and others). Under the influence of the results of those studies, 
Maxwell McCombs has, in fact, supplemented the agenda-setting theory, saying: „The media may not only 
tell us what to think about, they may also tell us how and what to think about, and even what to do about it." 
(Ha 2005, p. 5; Valenzuela & McCombs 2007, p. 19.) 
Currently, the situation has developed that many theories and hypotheses about influence, as the central 
problem of communication science, have been presented, but the relationships between them are weak. Many 
research results have, in fact, been achieved more likely than not in a theory resistant manner. Moreover, both 
minimal influence theories and theories and hypotheses that assert that media influence upon public opinion 
and electoral preferences are great have found empirical confirmation. From the standpoint of bivalent logic, 
by which no quality may at the same time be absent and present, the situation is absurd. 
Strong Or Weak Force? 
Many researchers are concerned about the mass media's strong mud-slinging and negative influence on 
society and many aspects of politics. In 1976, political scientist Michael Robinson presented the videomalaise 
concept. He analyzed the content of the news programs of the American television networks ABC, CBS 
and NBC and found that they are too interpretive, anti-institutionalized and centered too much on violence 
and conflict. According to Robinson, events are interpreted significantly more than previously and those 
interpretations are significantly more negative than reality (Robinson 1976a; Robinson 1976b). According 
to this and many other treatments, the reality constructed by the media is oftentimes distorted. Individuals, 
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however, accept the offered criticism and it is the basis for their future constructions of reality. In this manner 
the media undermines the attitudes and conduct of the masses and also democratic institutions (Franklin 
1994, p. 131; Meyrowitz 1995, p. 133; Ranney 1983, pp. 147-150; and others). 
Many social scientists, however, find that the concern over journalism is useless. Political scientist Pippa 
Norris of Harvard University has noted that until now there is no reliable evidence that confirms the negative 
effect of media (Norris 2000, p. 11). English political scientist Kenneth Newton, however, has taken the 
position that media may indeed have some influence over certain aspects of political life and in some situations 
that influence may be determinative, but that the media is still only an intermediary and the real source of the 
influence is a much more powerful force than the media (Newton 2006, p. 210). Newton concluded that „the 
media are generally a weak force in society" (ibid., p. 209). 
Both positions are also supported by true-life facts. Richard Nixon, Michael Dukakis, Gerald Ford, 
Edward Heath, John Major, Neal Kinnock and Lionel Jospin are examples of how extremely critical and 
muckraking press may shorten or even totally destroy the political careers of democratic leaders. All of the 
named individuals were attacked by the media and all of them soon disappeared from politics. 
But there are also other kinds of examples: Tony Blair, Helmut Kohl, Francois Mitterand, Jacques Chirac, 
John Howard, Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney were not only in power for a long time, but dominated the 
political scene in their own countries despite the fact that their relations with the press were not particularly 
friendly. Many examples of situations in which the media was unable to change public opinion can also be 
given. Despite tremendous pressure from the media during the famous Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, the USA 
president's ratings remained high and in the national elections held just a few months later the Democrats 
even gained seats in Congress (Zaller 2001). In 1956, the British newspaper, The Observer, sharply criticized 
Great Britain's intervention in the Suez War and lost readership as a result. The newspapers Guardian and 
Independent, aimed at the same target readership groups, as well as the tabloids Sun and Mirror, which were 
in favor of intervention, all gained readership. 
Kenneth Newton (2006, p. 220-225) brought forth the example of British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher's frightfully expensive political campaigns. He wrote that Thatcher's government's most essential 
PR issues were taxes, privatization, pollution and Thatcher's personal image. Newton noted that 240 million 
Pounds Sterling were spent only to „sell" privatization. Nevertheless, judging by public opinion surveys, that 
show was never popular. 
Constructed Reality 
In order to attempt to solve that riddle, the work of three researchers are essential in the quest. The first is 
Heinz von Foerster, who has already been mentioned. Von Foerster has noted that the quality of activity of 
nerve cells is not in correlation with the quality of life of every individual. All identifiable physical differences 
or differences existing in the natural environment are coded in the observer's brain in the same manner - they 
are ..translated" into a pattern of active-inactive neurons. Von Foerster wrote: „The response of a nerve cell 
does not encode the physical nature of the agents that caused its response. Encoded is only 'how much' at 
this point on my body, but not 'what'." (Von Foerster 2007, p. 43.) In other words: no matter what nerve cells 
are stimulated, they never react to the quality of the stimulation, but always only to the quantity. A person's 
receptors and the nerves that relay the nerve impulses are ..blind" to the quality of the stimulation and react 
only to the quantity. 
This raises a question: How does the brain achieve the result that a great number of quantitative changes 
from the data received from reactive nerve cells forms a qualitative subjective reality that is many-faceted, 
multicolored, full of tones and melodies, differentiated and is meaningful. Von Foerster demonstrated that that 
which is called perception is the endless recursive computing process. The observation does not produce an 
exact copy of reality, but an image, illusion and people do not accept things in the manner that they exist in 
reality (ibid., pp. 44-46). 
Second, assistance may be sought from Umberto Maturana and his student and coauthor, Fransisco Varela, 
whose so-called Santiago theory very significantly influenced the understanding of life, the relationship 
between perception and life as well as how living systems and social systems function. This influence was 
so great that it forced the revision of many theories. For example, Niklas Luhmann, probably the greatest 
sociologist of the second half of the 20th century, may be spoken of in terms of the early Luhmann (the 1970s) 
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and the later Luhmann (beginning in 1984). The difference is apparently caused by the circumstance that' 
Maturana's autopoiesis theory forced Luhmann to change his views. 
After Maturana and Varela, it turns out that human brains do not have direct access to the world and 
they don't require it. A person's nervous system is self-contained, a system that is operationally closed off 
from the environment, the activity of which is associated only with itself. Nerve cell activity reacts to nerve 
activity and not to the outside world. The truth that the system's operations are oriented exclusively and 
without exception only to its own operations was labeled by Maturana and Varela as ..operationally closed". 
They wrote: .Operationally the nervous system is a closed network of interacting neurons such that a change 
in the state of relative activity of a group of neurons always leads to a change in the state of relative activity 
of other groups of neurons either directly through synaptic action, or indirectly through the participation 
of some physical or chemical intervening element. Therefore, the organization of the nervous system as 
a finite neuronal network is defined by relations of closeness in the neuronal interactions generated in the 
network. Sensory and effector neurons, as they would be described by an observer who sees an organism in 
an environment, are not an exception to this because all sensory activity in an organism leads to activity in its 
effector surfaces, and all effector activity in turn leads to changes in its sensory surfaces. 
„That at this point an observer should see environmental elements intervening between the effector and 
the sensory surfaces of the organism is irrelevant because the nervous system is defined as a network of 
neuronal interactions by the interactions of its component neurons regardless of any intervening elements. 
Therefore, as long as the neuronal network closes onto itself, its phenomenology is the phenomenology of 
a closed system in which neuronal activity always leads to neuronal activity." (Maturana & Varela 1980, 
p. 127). 
Maturana considered perception to be a biological phenomenon that can only be understood as such 
(ibid, 7). Perception does not mean the reception of the objects of the outside world, but that world's constant 
recreation during the life process. Substantively, Maturana repeated that which Kant had already written in 
1781 in his „The Critique of Pure Reason": the reality in which people live has been created by themselves. 
According to Maturana, cognitive systems are closed, autopoietical systems that reproduce themselves 
(Maturana & Varela 1980, pp. XVIII-XIX). The term autopoiesis (< Greek poiesis 'creating, creation' is 
derived from the wordpoiein 'to do' + Greek autos 'yourself') means to create / to do to organize by yourself. 
How an autopoietic system observes the environment (that means which internal influences are tied to the 
interaction of the system and the environment) is not determined by the environment, but by the system 
(Maturana & Varela 1980, p. XXVIII and 22). This holds true for not only biological systems but for all 
autopoietic systems, including social systems, such as the press. 
Maturana also provides an essential answer to our question. He wrote: „A living system, due to its 
circular organization, is an inductive system and functions always in a predictive matter: what happened 
once will occur again. Its organization, (genetic and otherwise) is conservative and repeats only that which 
works. For the same reason living systems are historical systems; the relevance of a given conduct or mode 
of behavior is always determined in the past." (Maturana 1980, pp. 26-27.) 
The third man to look to for support is German philosopher Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933), who is the 
author of the book, „Philosophy of As If ' , which was published in 1911. The book itself was written 30 years 
earlier1 and in it Vaihinger presented his theory of fictions. Serving as a recommendation for this person who 
is a relatively unknown thinker is the fact that Vaihinger's main work has been translated into 12 different 
languages. During his lifetime he was more widely known as a researcher of Kant, but „Philosophy of As I f ' 
became the subject of ferocious criticism. This is not surprising because he set himself into opposition with 
the skeptics, positivists and materialists of his time with his assertion that teachings must not be evaluated 
on the basis of truth, but on the basis of their utility. Although Vaihinger was not nearly as well known by 
his contemporaries as were his critics, his book was well received in academic circles. Moreover, in the 
last quarter of the 20th century, or about a hundred years after his book was written, Vaihinger has been 
rediscovered and his theory of fictions has become a subject of great interest among literary experts and social 
scientists. 
Vaihinger wrote that people will never be able to understand the real world and that is the reason why 
1 August Seidel has written extensively about the story of creation of Philosophie des Als Ob: Seidel, A. 1921, „Wie 
die Philosophie des Als Ob entstand", Die Deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Band 2, 
Felix Meiner, Leipzig, pp. 175-203. 
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people construct thought systems, presuming that they fit in with reality (from this the „as i f ' in the title of the 
book). People act as if the real world fits together with their models. Vaihinger: „It must be remembered that 
the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality - this would be an utterly impossible 
task - but rather to provide us with an instrument for finding out way about more easily in the world." 
(Vaihinger 1924, pp. 159-160.) 
Many essential assertions have been collected. First of all: how an autopoietic system observes the 
environment is not determined by the environment, but by the system. From this it follows, among other 
things, that communication is not the transmission of information through language, but the construction 
of realty that corresponds to the system, and the media is not the mirror of reality, but rather the creator of 
the construction that corresponds to the system (see figure 3). The system's dynamic state variables reflect 
the past, for which reason the system's state may be compared with memory. The system always retains that 
which came before. 
Figure 3. Cognition and Communication As a System 
What one sees and how he describes the results of his observations determines the system's state 
variables - its memory, its level of knowledge. This, of course, means that one lacks neutral access to reality. 
Observing systems and their environments form an operative whole. In this process, the act of perceiving 
and that which is perceived can only be separated analytically from one another. Social groups or even entire 
societies organize their experiences via communications that are recursively connected to each other, thus 
building stable orders that underlie all social activities as collective knowledge or frames of reference. 
This is in accordance with Vailhinger's assertion that individuals are incapable of understanding the 
real world and people construct thought systems assuming that they fit in with reality. And third, Maturana's 
assertion that a living system, due to its circular organization, is an inductive system and always functions in 
a predictive manner: what happened once will occur again. How does this happen? 
Fictions As a Solution to the Paradox 
Gestalt psychologists Wolfgang Metzger and Wolfgand Kohler demonstrated experimentally as early as 1930 
that one's perception operates on a principle of distinction: figure versus (background (Kohler 1968, p. 76 et 
seq.; Metzger 1966, p. 693). People are capable of perceiving something only if they are able to differentiate 
one thing from another - a book lying on the table from the table, a bookcase against the wall is a bookcase, 
not the wall, etc. In other words, one never perceives identities, but differences; identities may be described 
as the unity of a difference. It follows that in perception one cannot get behind or beyond perception in 
order to compare the perceived with the not yet perceived, or to check the truth or objectivity of one's 
perceptions. British mathematician George Spencer-Brown demonstrated in his book, Laws of Form (1969) 
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that all logical structures, including constructions of reality, can be reduced to one simple operation - the 
creation of distinctions. 
Spencer-Brown noted that the „universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The 
skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle a plane. By 
tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage 
that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological 
science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorable from the original 
act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish 
different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please." 
(Spencer-Brown 1972, p. V.) 
Thus, if one perceives, describes or thinks about something, then one is always engaging in a game of 
differentiation. One person (and not another) describes (but does not explain) something as that (and not 
something else). In addition to that, people use language, the possibilities of meaning and social acceptance 
that they prefer and whose viability they confirm. People are observed with the aid of such distinctions as 
young and old, man and woman, cold or warm temperature, feelings of love and hate, etc. 
Social groups - even entire societies - organize their experiences with the assistance of reflexivity and 
communication, which are recursively tied to each other. The result of that is a more or less stable social order 
the basis of which is common activity. 
The tool for the organization of those experiences is Vaihinger's fictions. German communication scientist 
Siegfried J. Schmidt differentiates „fictionality" as a discoursive quality of literature and „fictions" as as if 
assumptions whose correspondence to reality is not proven, but which is simply taken for granted. The last 
he named as operative fictions (Schmidt 2005, p. 34; 2003, pp. 25, 33; 2001, p. 11). In evaluating operative 
fictions, the criteria for evaluating them is not their truth, correspondence to reality, but only their utility, the 
same as Vaihinger. Schmidt wrote: „Since in neurobiological terms the brain is operationally closed, and 
no-one can say whether imputations are true or false, society must rely on secondary interaction processes 
which we functionalize as indicators of the viability of our expectations." (Schmidt 2001, p. 11.) Following 
him, the social fiction of commonly shared collective knowledge serves as the basis for all interactions and 
communications. People assume that others know what they know, live in worlds similar to theirs, and use 
language more or less the way they do. Societies arise and last if and as long as people orient their activities in 
the broadest sense towards this allegedly shared common knowledge, which schematizes all their experiences 
which claim to be „real" and „relevant" (Schmidt 2005, p. 34; 2001, p. 17). 
This kind of reflexive perception occurs on many levels, for which reason Schmidt differentiated different 
types of fictions. Three of them are of interest: social fictions, media fictions and culture. The first means 
cognitive schemata and categories which are formed during socialization and which supports interaction. 
Media functions, according to Schmidt (2001, pp. 20-21), are the public sphere, public opinion and 
image. The latter are social constructs which may be described as coherent schemata consisting of cognitive 
and emotive structures assigned to persons, organizations, products, events or ideas. Images are built first of 
all for those referential items that are beyond immediate personal experience or accessibility for the majority 
of people in society. They are neither objective nor true, but intertwine information and opinions that are 
relevant in the public sphere and serve the purpose of constructing a desirable picture of people, organizations, 
etc., in the public sphere {ibid., p. 21). 
Following the logic of Niklas Luhmann, Schmidt understands culture as a program (Schmidt 1994, p. 599 
et seq.; 2001, p. 20; 2003, p. 38 et seq.; 2005, p. 35 et seq.). It turns out that with the aid of categorical and 
semantic differentiation, the system creates for itself a world model that systematizes knowledge needed for 
problem solutions in all dimensions that are relevant for the success and the survival of society. As knowledge 
systems, world models are based on dichotomies and differences such as system/environment, we/others, 
good/bad, love/hate, powerful/powerless, young/old, healthy/ill, and so on. 
„What 'good' or 'bad', 'true' or 'false', 'sane' or 'ill' really mean in a society and what relevance these 
distinctions and their combinations actually possess, is determined by what might be called the semantic 
programme of a society. Only this programme gets and keeps the world model going." (Schmidt 2005, p. 38; 
2003, p. 38; 2001, p. 18). Schmidt called this program of socially obligatory semantic instantiation of world 
models „culture". 
Approaching from the logic of social systems, it must be noted that the term culture is used in at least 
two meanings that are interrelated. The use of the word „used" here is not accidental: Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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indicated that „ [t]he meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein 2005, § 43). One meaning 
of culture is that which Schmidt wrote about. Something close to that meaning, although written in a 
different wording, was also written about culture by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who defined culture 
„[a]s interworked systems construable sign" (Geerts 1973, p. 14). 
In addition, the use of the word ..culture" is also used in a meaning that is tied to the concept of „creation 
of culture" (the creation of artifacts), „cultural industry", „ministry of culture", etc. Here is meant primarily 
the creation of (fine) art and the regulation of the creation of art objects or, in other words, the social subsystem 
dealing with art. Culture in that meaning is a part of the first. Culture as defined by Schmidt or Geertz does 
not mean a ticket to the opera or a season ticket to the productions of Estonian Concert (Eesti Kontsert), but 
nevertheless an operatic performance or a symphony concert are expressions of culture, its institutionalized 
form. Culture, via performance or concert, becomes visible. 
All actors in a society lean to a greater or lesser extent upon a common model of reality as collective 
knowledge and a cultural program. Thus, it becomes possible to understand one another and engage in 
common activity - despite the cognitive autonomy of the actors. 
Let it be noted once again that, different from the Cartesian dualistic model, truth here does not mean that 
the result of perception - the image or copy of reality - corresponds to the reality outside of the preceptor and 
that a person's understanding reflects the outside world as it really is. The truth here lies only in that which has 
been perceived conforms to operational fictions, the assertion that has been perceived is consistent with one's 
understanding of things as they should be. The same holds true not only for things, but also for assertions, 
where the proposition is consistent with one's preconceived notions. 
The correspondence or non-correspondence of the media's message to operational fictions with the 
community's common understandings explains why in some instances the media is influential and not in 
others. There is reason to believe that in public communication channels, the correspondence of that which is 
said about one or another politician or one or another political party to the treatment of reality by society and 
its different groups also determines the results of elections. Parliaments are formed on the basis of the voters' 
understandings and its members embody their countiymen's most precious imagination. 
Culture Is Not a „Soft" Value 
Social systems function on the basis of culture. Culture coordinates the actors' significant actions and thus 
makes possible the social system's coherence. Culture dictates a society's three basic processes: observations, 
communication and decisions. It decides what a person sees, what he turns his attention to and how he 
inteiprets those sights, what and in what manner he speaks, writes or draws as well as what he decides based 
on what he sees and hears. 
Communication and thinking in a language are naturally social: people are born into a certain environment 
where they acquire via the local culture a way to refer to the things of the world. The same is true of groups 
of society where every discourse construes reality in some manner. The word „discourse" here denotes two 
things. First, it denotes the connected network of meaning, metaphors, presentation, image, talks, sentences, 
etc., which creates some version of a thing, event or person. This is only one possibility among many: parallel 
to that are other possibilities of describing the same object. Those other possibilities show the thing in an 
entirely different light and tell a different story about it. The discourse constructs reality in some manner and 
different discourses act in different ways. 
This kind of presentation is one side of the coin. The other side is that which was indicated by French 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault. He defined discourse as ..practices which form the objects of 
which they speak" (Foucault 2005, p. 49). This definition points out the truth that discourses are structures for 
understanding by which people discover the world and which direct their activities. Management theoretician 
Steven Covey has written that „everything is created twice: first spiritually and then materially" (Covey 1997, 
p. 104). This becomes clear when we use building a house as an example: before the first nail is hammered 
into the wall, the structure is planned in one's head or on paper. A person's activities are guided by the images 
of his senses. In other words: the image is tomorrow's reality. Things are created and also destroyed first in 
the form of images. Discourses direct people's knowledge, their common understanding of things and events, 
and from that follows activity. In this maimer, society and its relationships are constantly being recreated with 
the help of culture. From this an essential conclusion: culture is not at all a „soft value", but something that 
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may direct attention to that which is wished for or desired. Culture forms that basis upon which successful 
functioning of the system (society, organization, business) is possible at all. 
Returning now to the main issue: culture is also the thing that helps operationally closed and cognitively 
autonomous systems to function in a cooperative manner. The actors are supported in their activities by 
common knowledge as well as a cultural program and understandings. Thus, their common activities are 
made possible despite cognitive autonomy. It is upon that very basis that operationally closed systems in a 
complex environment are viable. 
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